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Tackling the issue of how substantial assistance or a criminal defen-
dant's cooperation with the government is to be handled is a daunting task.
Cooperation by the accused has always been a critical element in law en-
forcement strategies. In the federal system, following the passage of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984' and the subsequent birth of the sentencing
guidelines shortly thereafter, the cooperating defendant has become even
more important to law enforcement.
In responding to the reform proposal recently set forth in the Journal
of Legislation,2 four questions warrant further examination: (1) Who is to
judge the value of a defendant's cooperation? (2) How is that cooperation to
be rated or evaluated? (3) How much discretion are we going to give the
person or institution ultimately deciding on the value of the cooperation? (4)
When should this process occur? Let us begin exploration through three sce-
narios.3 By way of these three scenarios, it is my purpose to show some of
the difficulties embodied in the issues surrounding substantial assistance,
and hopefully to begin answering the four questions posed.
A. Scenario 1
A young man by the name of Josd Martin is arrested with a friend
while sitting in a car parked outside of a drug store. Mr. Martin is a passen-
ger in the car and his friend is seated in the driver's compartment at the time
of the arrest. Unbeknownst to Mr. Martin, his involvement with a drug
1. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, P.L. No. 98-473, §§ 211-12, 98 Stat. 1987-2017 (1984) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
2. Maria Limbert, Problems Associated with Prosecutorial Control over Filing Substantial Assistance
Motions anda Proposal for a Substantial Assistance Pre-sentence Hearing, 27 J. LEGIS. 251 (2001).
3. All of the scenarios presented in this article are based on actual factual scenarios or portions of scenar-
ios that the author has encountered in some fashion, but have been modified where needed to protect attorney-
client privilege and client identity. All defendant names are fictitious, and any similarities with the names of
actual individuals are purely coincidental.
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transaction that just took place was videotaped and audio taped. The person
to whom the crack cocaine was sold was an undercover police officer. As he
is being taken down to the station, Mr. Martin opens up his mouth and starts
arguing with the arresting officer that he sold no dope. The officer continues
the conversation by saying that he knows all about Martin and has been
watching him for some time. Mr. Martin then responds with the obligatory
incriminating language as is so often the plight of defendants winding up in
federal court: "Alright. I might have been involved with the sale, but it
wasn't my dope."
At his arraignment, Mr. Martin explains the entire situation to his
lawyer. One of the case agents approaches the lawyer, and informs her that
law enforcement would be interested in having Mr. Martin proffer (cooper-
ate) with law enforcement.4 The agent promises the lawyer that cooperation
points would be in order if Mr. Martin agreed to such a proffer. No specific
number of points is discussed.
Mr. Martin ultimately proffers, and provides law enforcement with
very valuable information. In fact, the information is so valuable that it al-
lows law enforcement to arrest and indict another drug supplier on the
streets. The information also allows law enforcement to confirm many of
their hunches regarding drug dealers in Mr. Martin's neighborhood. The
lawyer is not present for the proffer.
Mr. Martin decides to change his plea in the case, and the lawyers
for both parties then engage in plea negotiations. Unfortunately for Mr.
Martin, he has his sentence enhanced to a mandatory minimum period of
imprisonment because of prior convictions for drug trafficking.5 The gov-
ernment tells the defense lawyer not to worry though, because the enhance-
ment will be essentially nullified by a motion the government is prepared to
file on Mr. Martin's behalf. In its motion, the government will suggest to
the court that a downward departure of two offense level points is appropri-
ate. Despite their best efforts, Mr. Martin and his defense lawyer are unable
to persuade the government that the enhancement is out of line, and that the
two-point reduction for substantial assistance is insufficient.
4. Although beyond the scope of this particular article, the entire notion of what exactly a "proffer" is
needs to be brought into the discussion of substantial assistance. At its most fundamental point, a proffer
means to divulge information to law enforcement officials, typically in a room with at least a case agent in-
volved. But proffers can develop into many different shapes and sizes. Proffers can lead to further discus-
sions with law enforcement personnel out of the area or from another agency; review of video tapes, mug
shots, or line-ups previously made by law enforcement; identification of voices on an audio tape; conducting
monitored telephone conversations; leading law enforcement through high crime areas to identify various
landmarks or structures relevant to ongoing criminal investigations; and controlled drug transactions.
5. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b), 851 (2000).
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B. Scenario 2
As soon as Thomas Smith stepped off the train, he was arrested for
trafficking in heroin. He had been through this before. After all, he had
served as a mule for a drug lord in New York City for a considerable period
of time, and had already served a five-year sentence awhile back. He was
well familiar with the system, and was well familiar with the street life that
he was living over the past ten years. So when it came to meeting his law-
yer, his request to participate in a proffer with the government was an easy
decision for him to make.
The prosecutor willingly took the proffer of Mr. Smith. This time
the defense lawyer was present, as well as the prosecutor and three law en-
forcement agents. All the individuals on the side of the government were
interested in hearing what Mr. Smith had to say, particularly as it related to
the drug lord in New York City. Mr. Smith had a lot to say, and what he had
to say he expressed in an intelligent and articulate way.
Being wise to the ways of the streets, Mr. Smith was able to give the
agents, who were attentively listening, more than they had bargained for. He
told them not only about the drug lord in New York City, but also discussed
with law enforcement at the multiple proffer sessions numerous details re-
garding supply networks that extended beyond U.S. borders. After one of
the proffers, the anxious prosecutor asked the defense lawyer if one more
proffer session would be possible. This time, the prosecutor wanted to bring
in an agent from another neighboring district, so that law enforcement could
extend its sweep based on the information that Mr. Smith had given them.
At that subsequent proffer session, the newly added agent, for one
reason or another, chose not to believe Mr. Smith's statements. In fact, he
claims he is certain that Mr. Smith is lying. Unsure as to whether to believe
the agent or Mr. Smith, the prosecutor nevertheless offers Mr. Smith a two-
level departure for his substantial assistance (or for his troubles, depending
on one's perspective).
The defense lawyer later confirms after Mr. Smith is sentenced that
the new agent who had been brought in to the last session just did not like
Mr. Smith, and that all the other agents were able to confirm the veracity of
the salient points of Mr. Smith's statement. No law enforcement action is
ever taken against the New York drug lord. For all intents and purposes the
information obtained in the proffer sessions is not used. The two-level
downward departure that the government recommends to the court, and





Monique Johnson always wanted to be a millionaire. When she was
arrested for engaging in securities fraud, wire fraud, and mail fraud, she felt
grave remorse. She felt remorse for herself because her business plan had
failed miserably, but also remorse for the customers she let down. She told
her lawyer that under no circumstances did she want to go to trial, and that
she wanted to cooperate in every way possible with the government.
Her lawyer quickly discovered that one of the reasons Ms. Johnson's
business efforts failed was because of her lack of organization. When he
made a simple request of her to outline in detail the companies she had
formed, she responded with a 40-page letter, complete with diagrams and
narrative. The prosecutor agreed to the proffer session but with great hesita-
tion. When the session began, Ms. Johnson could not stop talking. She
rambled on for almost an hour in a fashion that even her lawyer had to admit
was nonsensical. She tried in vain to explain her 40-page chart, but it only
made the prosecutor more impatient.
That is not to say, however, that the prosecutor was entirely tuned
out. When Ms. Johnson successfully identified three individuals of a con-
spiracy that the government had been investigating for the past several years,
and added a couple of new names to that group, the prosecutor took interest
in what she had to say. He agreed to a subsequent proffer.
The lawyers on the case eventually negotiate a plea agreement that
leaves room for a motion by the government for cooperation. It also leaves
room for possible sentencing departure under Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 35(b). Unfortunately for Ms. Johnson, she was never able to get her
act together, or her facts concisely presented to the prosecutor. Despite her
best efforts, the government was never sufficiently impressed with Ms. John-
son's presentation to believe that substantial assistance was warranted, and
thus, never filed its motion for substantial assistance. As a consequence, Ms.
Johnson never received a sentence reduction despite the fact that she had
valuable information among her clutter.
II. WHO Is TO JUDGE?
In all three scenarios, the prosecution is effectively the decision-
maker as to how many points the cooperation is to receive. In all three sce-
narios, almost complete discretion rests with the prosecution. It appears that,
while people may agree on little in the area of substantial assistance, one
exception is concern over large and growing prosecutorial discretion. "Post-
SRA prosecutorial discretion is perhaps the single most-cited topic men-
tioned with respect to the substantial assistance policy statement. In context,
[Vol. 29:1
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however, this concern is only one part of a much larger general concern of
increased prosecutorial discretion under the guidelines."6 A survey by the
Federal Judicial Center reported that eighty-six percent of survey respon-
dents, which included individuals working in the federal criminal justice
system, believed that "sentencing guidelines give too much discretion to
prosecutors.",7 Perhaps more interesting is that 74.9 percent of federal judges
and 58.6 percent of chief probation officers agreed that prosecutors had "the
greatest influence on the final guideline sentence.",
8
Leaving the decision-making with the prosecution creates inherent
discrepancies as to who receives what and how much. There are no rules
that would dictate how much certain cooperation is worth. This lack of uni-
formity is a significant force running contrary to the goals of the Sentencing
Guidelines. The Guidelines, after all, are to bring some sense of uniformity
to the sentencing process in the federal system. That is entirely undercut, if
the prosecutor gives, for example, a two-point offense level reduction to one
defendant for bringing a new criminal case to their attention, but four points
to another defendant who might be able to bring only valuable information to
an already ongoing law enforcement effort. And, as the above scenarios
illustrate, personalities and experience in the field could come into play in
the prosecutor's decision.
The problem is plainly aggravated when the decision to file a sen-
tencing enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 851 rests with the prosecution as
well. As the first scenario illustrates, what one hand giveth, the other hand
can quickly taketh away. That scenario not only runs contrary to the uni-
formity objective in the Guidelines, but would also seem to run contrary to
one of the ultimate goals of the Sentencing Guidelines themselves, which is
to encourage cooperation among defendants. What defendant in his or her
right mind would cooperate only to know that the government is still going
to file a sentencing enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 851?
Therefore, there can be no real quibble as to the need to place the de-
cision of doling out offense level reductions for substantial assistance in the
hands of a neutral party, as Limbert proposes.9 But one may legitimately
6. LINDA D. MAXFIELD & JOHN H. KRAMER, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUBSTANTIAL
ASSISTANCE: AN EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK GAUGING EQUITY IN CURRENT FEDERAL POLICY AND PRACTICE 14
(Jan. 1998), available at http://www.ussc.gov/research.htm. The authors of this study were at the time Acting
Director and Staff Director, respectively, of the Office of Policy Analysis of the U.S. Sentencing Commission.
The paper presented an analysis of data gathered by the Commission's Substantial Assistance Staff Working
Group.
7. Molly Treadway Johnson & Scott A. Gilbert, The United States Sentencing Guidelines: Results of the
Federal Judicial Center's Survey, contained in REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAW OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (Dec. 5, 1996).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 7.
2002]
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ask: isn't this already done? After all, U.S.S.G. § 5Kl.1, which is the main
sentencing guideline governing substantial assistance motions, states that
"[u]pon motion of the government.., the court may depart from the guide-
lines." (emphasis added.) Similar language is found at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e),
which provides that "[u]pon motion of the Government, the court shall have
the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as
minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an of-
fense." Nothing in this language requires the court to grant the govern-
ment's motion.
The Congress authorized the United States Sentencing Commission
to:
assure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of im-
posing a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed, includ-
ing a sentence that is lower than that established by statute as a
minimum sentence, to take into account a defendant's substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person
who has committed an offense.'
0
It did just that by placing the responsibility for filing the motion with
the government, and the authority to decide the motion with the court.
The proposal espoused by Limbert would shift the responsibility for
decision-making to a federal magistrate judge. This may not have that sig-
nificant of an impact, however, if the goal is to try to reduce the discretion
the prosecution has over substantial assistance credits. If the prosecution,
for one reason or another, believes that substantial assistance should not be
granted or, at most, for only one level even when the defendant pleads for
more because he or she truly has provided substantial assistance, nothing
will change in the prosecution's discretionary power by shifting the deci-
sion-making to a federal magistrate judge.
But the question is nevertheless a nagging one. If the power of who
makes the motion rests solely with the prosecution, then the ultimate deci-
sion-making authority often rests with it as well. If, as the Sentencing
Commission has decided, it takes a motion by the government before the
court can grant any substantial assistance benefit at all, the government de-
prives the court of the power of that decision by simply not filing the mo-
tion.
As the scenarios point out, the power tug-of-war is considerably
more complicated than it might first appear. In all three scenarios, the gov-
10. 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (2000).
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ernment listens to the defendant during proffer sessions. In all three, the
information's value does not translate into a benefit for the defendant
equivalent to its true worth.
In scenario 3, the confusing and disorganized manner in which the
defendant presented the information hindered the government's evaluation of
the information, and, for the less patient prosecutor, also gave the govern-
ment an excuse for not filing a substantial assistance motion. One can imag-
ine the following exchange between the prosecutor and Ms. Johnson's law-
yer following the proffer session. "We know your client tried her best, but
frankly, we simply couldn't make heads or tails out of what she was trying to
tell us."
In scenario 2, personalities-and egos-come into play." Some law
enforcement have their way of dealing with the world in which they work,
and so do defendants. When a defendant comes along who, because of his
"inside track" and his own touch of arrogance, can inadvertently rub a case
agent the wrong way by pointing out errors in the agent's view of the world
of crime (or at least one of the neighborhoods), the backlash can have seri-
ous repercussions for the defendant. What would have happened if Mr.
Smith in scenario 2 had unbeknownst to him fallen upon false information,
but the bulk of what he had to say at the proffer was valuable and correct?
Should he in effect be punished (either by the government's refusal to file a
substantial assistance motion or one for only a point or two) because one
agent happens to discount all of what Mr. Smith says merely because he was
honestly incorrect on one portion of the information he proffered? What goes
on in the proffer room, even when things like egos and personalities are at
play there, ends up having an enormous impact on the court's sentencing
power. What if the agent in scenario 2 who, for one reason or another, did
not believe any of Mr. Smith's information (even though it was correct) was
supervising agent and had veto power over all substantial assistance motions
in the case? In that instance, despite Mr. Smith's having given the govern-
ment substantial assistance, the court never has a chance to take that infor-
mation into consideration at sentencing, because the supervising agent re-
fused to permit a substantial assistance motion to be filed.
11. It is, of course, impossible to avoid entirely these elements in the evaluation of a defendant's substan-
tial assistance. The goal is to limit their impact, since they undercut uniformity and equity in the evaluation of
and reward for substantial assistance. And for any prosecutor or defense lawyer who has participated in nu-
merous proffer sessions, the impact of these elements is undeniably strong. Examples include the overbearing
agent, the taciturn defendant who fails to speak up even though it is in his or her interest to do so, the skeptical
prosecutor who simply refuses to believe what the defendant is telling him or her, and the supervisor who
simply wishes to send a message to all defendants in a particular conspiracy that the government is going to
play "hard ball" and give no one more than a two-point reduction. The talk around the proffer table often
becomes that of the "generous" prosecutor or the "stingy" one.
2002]
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Scenario 1 is perhaps the most troubling because it appears to reflect
an unresolved conflict between the governing statute and the Guidelines.
Section 3553(e) of Title 28 draws the line between responsibilities: the gov-
ernment files the substantial assistance motion, and the court is thereby au-
thorized to depart, even if to do so means to sentence the defendant below a
mandatory minimum sentence.
In drug trafficking cases where mandatory minimum sentences come
into play, 2 the government may seek to increase mandatory minimum sen-
tences. In one instance, a mandatory minimum sentence can be increased
from ten years to twenty years, and once again from twenty years to life. 3
In another instance, a mandatory minimum sentence can be increased from
five years to ten years. 4 The enhancement automatically takes place with a
mere one-page filing by the government setting forth the defendant's prior
drug offense.
The sentencing power placed in the prosecution's hands is enormous.
Let us assume, for example, that Mr. Martin in scenario 1 has one prior fel-
ony conviction for drug trafficking (scored at three criminal history points,
placing Mr. Martin in criminal history category 11)." Assume further that
the amount of crack cocaine he sells to the undercover officer is six grams.
This quantity of crack cocaine results in a mandatory minimum five-year
sentence.' 6 The Sentencing Guidelines place Mr. Martin at offense level 26
for a sentencing range of seventy to eighty-seven months.'7 Let us further
assume that Mr. Martin's cooperation is valued by the prosecutor as a two-
level benefit. By filing a motion for substantial assistance, the government
would authorize the district court to sentence Mr. Martin below the statutory
minimum of five years. 8 Under a strict guideline calculation, Mr. Martin's
offense level could then potentially drop from 26 levels to 21 levels. This
calculation results from a two-level reduction for Mr. Martin's substantial
assistance (assuming the court's grants the government's motion) and an
additional three-level reduction in the event Mr. Martin pleads guilty (again
assuming the court grants Mr. Martin acceptance of responsibility points). 9
At that offense level, Mr. Martin's sentencing range drops to forty-one to
12. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b).
13. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
14. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B).
15. United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual Ch. 5, Pt. A (2001) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.] sets forth the
sentencing chart in its entirety.
16. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii).
17. U.S.S.G. § 2Dl(c)(7).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000).
19. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.l.
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fifty-one months, which, even at the high end, is substantially below the
five-year mandatory minimum sentence.
Mr. Martin's prior conviction could come back to haunt him, how-
ever, to erase any benefit of his cooperation-and in the process dramatically
change the district court's sentencing power. The federal drug trafficking
laws give the prosecution unbridled discretion to file an enhancement
whereby Mr. Martin's mandatory minimum sentence is not five years but ten
years.20  The statute governing such enhancements does not require the
United States attorney to provide any reason whatsoever for filing the en-
hancement. It also sets no standards or requirements for the filing of the
sentencing enhancement.2
Therefore, if the government believes that enhancement is appropri-
ate, a notification to the court of Mr. Martin's prior drug offense increases
his mandatory minimum sentence to ten years. In this event, Mr. Martin's
starting offense level is 29, which results in a sentencing range of 97 to 121
months. This is the first sentencing range in the appropriate criminal history
category (II) where we can find the mandatory ten-year sentence.
The same five-level reduction (two levels for substantial assistance
and three levels for acceptance of responsibility) now brings Mr. Martin
down to offense level 24, resulting in a sentencing range of fifty-seven to
seventy-one months. Thus, by sentencing Mr. Martin even at the low end of
that guideline range (fifty-seven months), the district court is back to sen-
tencing Mr. Martin roughly where he would have originally fallen without
any cooperation and without any offense level reduction for foregoing trial
in the case, namely, five years. The entire benefit to Mr. Martin's coopera-
tion is nullified not by the court but by the prosecutor.
Limbert's proposal of placing on the defendant the burden of filing a
substantial assistance motion dramatically levels the playing field. One
might argue, though, that both parties should be able to file such motions.
After all, there is no reason to deprive the government of its leverage in prof-
fer discussions of filing such a motion, and, as Limbert correctly observes,
the neutral decision-maker will likely rely heavily on the prosecutor's opin-
ion.22 In other words, a prosecutor's motion is likely to be looked upon more
favorable in most situations than a defendant's motion.23
20. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii).
21. See, 21 U.S.C. § 851.
22. See, supra note 2, at 264.
23. The courts of appeals have not been receptive to arguments in support of allowing the defendant to
file substantial assistance motions. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 181 F.3d 128, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc),
cert. deniedsub noma. Sealed Petitioner v. United States, 528 U.S. 989 (1999) ("in the absence of a government
motion, a district court lacks authority under the Guidelines to depart from the applicable sentencing range on
the basis of a defendant's substantial assistance."); In re Sealed Case, 292 F.3d 913, 917 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The
2002)
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Moreover, although Limbert's proposal acknowledges that the de-
fendant-informant has first-hand knowledge of the amount and extent of his
or her cooperation that does not necessarily mean that the defendant's view
of the worth of such assistance will be valued. Practically every defendant
in every conspiracy thinks he or she has the inside information that is most
beneficial to the government.
Furthermore, there may well be instances where the government does
not wish to go through the full-blown hearing that Limbert's proposal calls
for. In a sensitive investigation where the defendant has given valuable in-
formation, yet because of the ongoing nature of the investigation the gov-
ernment does not wish to bring forward the value of the defendant's informa-
tion through a court hearing, the government should be able to file in its own
right an unopposed motion for substantial assistance. Because of the unop-
posed nature of the motion, no court hearing would be needed to ensure that
the defendant receives full value for the substantial assistance, and the se-
crecy of the ongoing investigation would be preserved.24
III. How Is SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE To BE EVALUATED?
The handling by the courts and the government of substantial assis-
tance motions under the Sentencing Guidelines suggests two points: no two
districts appear to evaluate substantial assistance the same, and federal
judges have no difficulty determining reasons for granting substantial assis-
tance departures.
Districts have authority to establish their own policies for reviewing
substantial assistance motions. The United States Attorneys' Manual
("USAM") requires prior internal approval before such a motion can be
filed. The USAM provides as follows:
Section 5K1 .1 of the Sentencing Guidelines allows the United States
to file a pleading with the sentencing court which permits the court to depart
courts have recognized, however, some limited relief from this prohibition. District courts have the authority
to grant relief "if they find that the refusal [by the government to file a substantial assistance motion] was
based on an unconstitutional motive," or "if the prosecutor's refusal to move was not rationally related to any
legitimate Government cod." Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992). Relief may also be forth-
coming if the defendant provided cooperation pursuant to a plea agreement, and can demonstrate that the
government's refusal to file the substantial assistance motion is attributable to bad faith or breach of the plea
agreement. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 268 (1971); United States v. Jones, 58 F.3d 688, 692
(D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Lukse, 286 F.3d 906, 912-13 (6th Cir. 2002).
24. Concerns over protecting the integrity of an ongoing investigation and the confidential nature of
information often arise in the context of substantial assistance being offered by someone. When those con-
cerns arise in the context of a hearing on a substantial assistance motion, the court can easily address those
concerns by placing the hearing under seal. This is not a new problem. It arises from time to time at sentenc-
ing where a defendant's cooperation may be discussed in detail by the court. Again, the easy solution is plac-
ing the hearing under seal, which is typically in both parties' interests at that point.
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below the indicated guideline, on the basis that the defendant provided sub-
stantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another. Authority to
approve such pleadings is limited to the United States Attorney, the Chief
Assistant United States Attorney, and supervisory criminal Assistant United
States Attorneys, or a committee including at least one of these individuals.
Similarly, for Department of Justice attorneys, approval authority should be
vested in a Section Chief or Office Director, or such official's deputy, or in a
committee which includes at least one of these individuals.
Every United States Attorney or Department of Justice Section Chief
or Office Director shall maintain documentation of the facts behind and jus-
tification for each substantial assistance pleading. The repository or reposito-
ries of this documentation need not be the case file itself. Freedom of Infor-
mation Act considerations may suggest that a separate form showing the
final decision be maintained.
The procedures described above shall also apply to Motions filed
pursuant to Rule 35(b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, where the sen-
tence of a cooperating defendant is reduced after sentencing on motion of the
United States. Such a filing is deemed for sentencing purposes to be the
equivalent of a substantial assistance pleading.25
Most districts have a written policy on the topic, and virtually all dis-
tricts have some type of approval procedure in place. 26 Typically, the ap-
proval process involves supervisory personnel and/or a committee. 7 But
even with procedures in place, policies are not internally or consistently fol-
lowed. Internal procedures and policies are consistently followed in about
half to two-thirds of the districts.28 In other words, even with a policy in
place, nothing prevents a district from acting inconsistently. Indeed, upon
closer analysis, there would seem to be no particular incentive to any district
to act consistently according to its internal policies on substantial assistance.
Acting inconsistently with a particular written policy translates into in-
creased flexibility in dealing with informant-defendants.
The USAM also instructs United States attorneys to consider the de-
fendant's cooperation in deciding whether to enter into a plea agreement:
Defendant's Cooperation. The defendant's willingness to provide
timely and useful cooperation as part of his/her plea agreement
should be given serious consideration. The weight it deserves will
vary, of course, depending on the nature and value of the coopera-
tion offered and whether the same benefit can be obtained without
25. United States Attorneys' Manual ("USAM"), § 9-27.400 (B) (Plea Agreements Generally).





having to make the charge or sentence concession that would be
involved in a plea agreement. In many situations, for example, all
necessary cooperation in the form of testimony can be obtained
through a compulsion order under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6003. In such
cases, that approach should be attempted unless, under the circum-
stances, it would seriously interfere with securing the person's
conviction. If the defendant's cooperation is sufficiently substantial
to justify the filing of a 5K1 .1 Motion for a downward departure,
the procedures set out in USAM 9-27.400 (B) shall be followed.29
The policy does not define how the "nature and value of the coopera-
tion offered" is to be determined.
The USAM provides slightly more guidance when deciding not to
prosecute a person in exchange for his or her cooperation. In this instance,
considerations of the public interest are primarily weighed.3"
(A) In determining whether a person's cooperation may be neces-
sary to the public interest, the attorney for the government, and
those whose approval is necessary, should weigh all relevant con-
siderations, including:
(1) The importance of the investigation or prosecution to an effec-
tive program of law enforcement;
(2) The value of the person's cooperation to the investigation or
prosecution; and
(3) The person's relative culpability in connection with the offense
or offenses being investigated or prosecuted and his/her history
with respect to criminal activity.
(B) Comment. This paragraph is intended to assist Federal prosecu-
tors, and those whose approval they must secure, in deciding
whether a person's cooperation appears to be necessary to the pub-
lic interest. The considerations listed here are not intended to be
all-inclusive or to require a particular decision in a particular
case. Rather they are meant to focus the decision-maker's attention
on factors that probably will be controlling in the majority of
cases. 31 (emphasis added).
Further guidance is given in a following section of the USAM.
While this guidance is directed at a decision whether to prosecute in return
29. USAM, § 9-27.420(B)(1) (Plea Agreements--Considerations to be Weighed).
30. USAM, § 9-27.600(B)(3) (Entering into Non-prosecution Agreements in Return for Cooperation-
Generally).
31. USAM, § 9-27.620 (Entering into Non-prosecution Agreements in Return for Cooperation--
Considerations to be Weighed).
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for a person's cooperation, the same factors make similar sense when con-
sidering substantial assistance motions.
In order to be in a position to adequately assess the potential value of
a person's cooperation, the prosecutor should insist on an "offer of proof' or
its equivalent from the person or his/her attorney. The prosecutor can then
weigh the offer in terms of the investigation or prosecution in connection
with which cooperation is sought. In doing so, he/she should consider such
questions as whether the cooperation will in fact be forthcoming, whether the
testimony or other information provided will be credible, whether it can be
corroborated by other evidence, whether it will materially assist the investi-
gation or prosecution, and whether substantially the same benefit can be ob-
tained from someone else without an agreement not to prosecute. After as-
sessing all of these factors, together with any others that may be relevant, the
prosecutor can judge the strength of his/her case with and without the per-
son's cooperation, and determine whether it may be in the public interest to
agree to forego prosecution under the circumstances.32
What seems to be sought for evaluating substantial assistance-
whether examining these factors or the list of objective and subjective fac-
tors proposed by Limbert-is a "totality of the circumstances" standard. In
other words, the more factors the court considers, the more likely the evalua-
tion is to be fair.33
While this method may not foster predictability, it does carry bene-
fits for both the government and the defendant. On the one hand, the gov-
ernment's flexibility is increased by allowing it to consider a wide range of
factors when determining the value of a defendant's assistance. This appears
to match current practice. For the defendant, a "totality of the circum-
stances" standard would allow more grounds to argue that the assistance
provided was in fact valuable to the government.
At the end of the day, we can turn to the list of factors contained in
the Sentencing Guidelines for considerable guidance in this area. The list,
while not exhaustive, is an acceptable starting point.
32. USAM, § 9-27.620(B)(2) (Entering into Non-prosecution Agreements in Return for Cooperation-
Considerations to be Weighed).
33. Although Limbert in her proposal also calls for a "totality of the circumstances" standard, this
author does not believe it is practicable to divide sharply between objective and subjective factors. While the
decision-maker-whether a federal district judge or a federal magistrate judge-will always try to focus on
objective factors, subjective considerations inevitably come into play, and should. For example, what may be
a risk taken for one defendant is a normal state of affairs for another. Substantial assistance is, after all, a




(a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for
reasons stated that may include, but are not limited to, considera-
tion of the following:
(1) The court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of
the defendant's assistance, taking into consideration the govern-
ment's evaluation of the assistance rendered;
(2) The truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any informa-
tion or testimony provided by the defendant;
(3) The nature and extent of the defendant's assistance;
(4) Any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the
defendant or his family resulting from his assistance;
(5) The timeliness of the defendant's assistance.34
Two steps would eliminate significantly the unnecessary hodge-
podge of considerations that now seems to be in effect. First, the Sentencing
Commission and the United States Department of Justice should consider
joining forces to adopt a single set of factors for evaluating substantial assis-
tance. 35 Having a single set of factors would benefit all parties concerned. It
would provide an inclusive roadmap for the courts; it would provide clearer
and more unified guidance for all United States Attorney Offices across the
country; and it would allow defense lawyers to more effectively counsel
their clients who may desire to cooperate with the government.
Second, a single policy on substantial assistance motions governing
all United States Attorney Offices should be adopted. If the nation's federal
criminal justice system can operate on a single set of Sentencing Guidelines,
there is no reason why the executive branch cannot operate on a single pol-
icy for substantial assistance motions. The fact that there are multiple poli-
cies throughout the country (which apparently are often ignored) only un-
dermines the uniformity sought in the Sentencing Guidelines. Moreover,
the fact that there are multiple policies produces the unseemly result of co-
operation being valued more (or less) depending on the jurisdiction in which
the defendant happens to be arrested. Evaluating substantial assistance will
34. US.S.G. § 5K.l.
35. It is assumed that defense interests would be represented through the Sentencing Commission's vari-
ous committee structures. To the extent the outcome is a "totality of the circumstances" standard, the defense
will benefit, as noted in the text. It is important, however, that the list of factors reflect defense input, since
defense lawyers will likely be the first ones to explain to defendants what they can expect through cooperation.
In other words, defense lawyers may often be the first ones to evaluate possible assistance so as to be able to
advise their clients of the chances of a substantial assistance motion.
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always be a rather subjective exercise. That does not mean, however, that
we should abandon all efforts to make the exercise a more objective one.
IV. How MUCH DISCRETION To THE DECISION-MAKER?
Having a "totality of the circumstances" test for evaluating substan-
tial assistance may rightly lead one to conclude that we now need to limit the
court's discretion in deciding such motions. If such limitations are not im-
posed, it is argued that sentencing disparities may creep back into the sys-
tem. This rationale underlies Limbert's proposal to limit downward depar-
ture motions for substantial assistance to two to five levels.36
The short answer to this argument lies in the Sentencing Guidelines
themselves. In Section 5K2.0, the Sentencing Commission makes clear in
one of its many policy statements37 that "[t]he decision as to whether and to
what extent departure is warranted rests with the sentencing court on a case-
specific basis."38 (emphasis added). This policy statement mirrors the statu-
tory instruction to federal courts regarding sentencing.
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the
range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) [referring to sentencing guidelines]
unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circum-
stance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by
the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result
in a sentence different from that described.39
Nowhere does either the statute or the Sentencing Guidelines limit
the extent of an otherwise authorized departure-regardless of whether the
departure is upwards or downwards.
In Koon v. United States,4" the Supreme Court made clear that sen-
tencing is the traditional exercise of discretion by the court. And, in the Su-
preme Court's view in this post-guidelines era, sentencing necessarily en-
36. Limbert, supra note 3, at 263.
37. Policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, which are clearly identified as such in the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, are distinct from guidelines which the Sentencing Commission also promulgates. According
to the statute governing the Sentencing Commission's functions, policy statements regard "application of the
guidelines or any other aspect of sentencing or sentence implementation that in the view of the Commission
would further the purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code." 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(a)(2). The initial guidelines needed to be submitted to Congress by a set deadline, but policy statements
did not. Federal judges must only "consider" when determining a particular sentence "any pertinent policy
statement issued by the Sentencing Commission ... that is in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced."
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5). They are, however, required to sentence within the Guidelines unless a departure
ground exists. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). In other words, policy statements do not set forth requirements for fed-
eral judges to follow as do the guidelines.
38. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).
40. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
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compasses departures from the Sentencing Guidelines as well.4' For this
reason, the Supreme Court in Koon instructed appellate courts to analyze a
district court's departure under an abuse of discretion standard.42 Since
Koon, the lower courts have interpreted departure jurisprudence essentially
to allow specific departures so long as the Sentencing Guidelines do not pro-
hibit them.43 In short, departures are as much a fabric of the sentencing
scheme presently in effect as are the guideline sentences that fall well within
the "heartland" cases mapped out by the Sentencing Commission.
The absence in either the Sentencing Guidelines or the applicable
statutes of any limitation on a court's departure discretion rests on sound
policy for both law enforcement and the defense. Limbert's proposal of lim-
iting from two to five offense levels any departures for substantial assistance
is made for the salutary purpose of avoiding widespread sentencing dispar-
ity.44 But the evidence suggests that federal courts across the nation gener-
ally sentence within the guideline range otherwise suggested by the "heart-
land" cases described by the Sentencing Commission in the Sentencing
Guidelines.
For fiscal year 2000, for example, the Sentencing Commission re-
ports that 64.5 percent of cases are sentenced within the guideline range.
Substantial assistance departures occurred in 17.9 percent of cases, and
downward departures for other reasons occurred in 17 percent of cases. For
the same period of time, upward departures occurred in only 0.7 percent of
cases. 45 Not surprising, the highest percentage of substantial assistance de-
partures occurred in the area of drug trafficking (27.8 percent).46 These data
are similar to data for fiscal year 1995. At that time, 71 percent of cases
were sentenced within the guideline range; 19.7 percent received downward
departures for substantial assistance; 8.4 percent received departures for
other reasons; and 0.9 percent of the cases received an upward departure.47
Again, the area of highest substantial assistance departures was drug
trafficking (33.6 percent).48  This evidence comes from the period when no
41. Id. at 98.
42. Id.
43. Koon established a four-part analytical framework to guide appellate review of departure determina-
tions, classifying departure factors as: "(1) forbidden, (2) encouraged, (3) discouraged, or (4) unmentioned."
Id. at 95- 96.
44. Limbert, supra note 3, at 263.
45. Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, tbl. 5.32 (2000). This entire compilation of data is
located through the United States Sentencing Commission's web site, available at (http://www.ussc.gov). The
data are limited to six fiscal years beginning in 1995. The fiscal year used here is from October 1 to Septem-
ber 30.
46. United States Sentencing Commission, Office of Policy Analysis, 2000 Datafile, tbl. 9 at
www.ussc.gov/JUDPACK/2000/1 cOO.pdf (9/19/02).
47. United States Sentencing Commission, Office of Policy Analysis, 1995 Datafile, tbl. 8 at
www.ussc.gov/JUDPACK/1 995/1 cOO.pdf (9/19/02).
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ficking (33.6 percent).48 This evidence comes from the period when no de-
parture limitations were in place other than the Sentencing Guidelines them-
selves.
If sentencing disparity is the concern, then the proposed limitation
would have to be made across the board in both an upward and downward
fashion. A sentence that is increased, for instance, seven levels beyond the
guideline range mandated by the Sentencing Guidelines is as much a prob-
lem when it comes to disparate sentencing as a sentence that is seven levels
below. The problem is the same whether we are talking about departures
based on substantial assistance or any of the many other (and essentially lim-
itless) bases on which a departure can be constructed. In sum, the problem
of disparity does not go away if we limit a court's departure discretion solely
to substantial assistance motions.49
As noted above, the proposed limitation has problems for both the
prosecution and the defense. Returning to scenario 2 with our street-wise
drug trafficker, Thomas Smith, we can imagine a set of facts where the
agents and the defendant are truly of one mind, where the agents use Mr.
Smith's testimony to nab a drug kingpin in New York, and want to use Mr.
Smith as a testifying witness at the kingpin's trial. In this instance, the sub-
stantial assistance departure is probably a small price to pay for the consid-
erable law enforcement assistance which Mr. Smith lends. Law enforcement
may need to offer Mr. Smith more than five levels to make it worthwhile for
him to put himself and his family at risk forever.
V. WHEN SHOULD THE PROCESS OF DETERMINING SUBSTANTIAL
ASSISTANCE MOTIONS OCCUR?
Under Limbert's proposal, the decision as to how many levels a sub-
stantial assistance departure is worth, if any at all, would be made immedi-
ately prior to sentencing.5" While she is correct that under current practice
the government usually files its substantial assistance motion right before or
48. Id. at tbl. 9.
49. There seems to be no reason that justifies imposing a limit on a defense motion for a downward depar-
ture based on substantial assistance but not on a defense motion for a downward departure based on, for in-
stance, the defendant's diminished capacity. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13. Similarly, there seems to be no
reason for limiting the benefit a defendant could receive for his or her substantial assistance, but not limit how
much the court might upward depart based on, for example, the defendant's extreme conduct. See, e.g.,
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.8. Limbert's proposal, as stated, might run into equal protection challenges as well. But if the
challenge were answered by imposing the limit also on how far a court might upward depart-in other words,
imposing the limit on both defense and prosecution motions-the government would then lose an important
sentencing tool that currently allows it to seek an upward-sentencing departure reflecting a particular defen-
dant's heinous or brutal conduct that undisputably falls way beyond the "heartland" boundaries.
50. Limbert, supra note 3, at 264.
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during the sentencing hearing, the decision to file such a motion is often
made before the defendant pleads guilty or is convicted.
Reality dictates that a proffer session usually occurs when the prose-
cution wants it to occur. In scenarios 1 and 2, law enforcement may believe
both Messrs. Martin and Smith can assist immediately with ongoing investi-
gations. For that reason, the proffer session might occur shortly after the
arrest. In scenario 3, the urgency of the proffer and assistance from the de-
fendant may not be present, therefore, the proffer session may not take place
until shortly before the change of plea conference or even afterwards. In-
deed, because of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b), the proffer ses-
sion could even take place after sentencing.
In analyzing when a determination on substantial assistance is made,
three events need to be separated out: when the proffer session occurs; when
the motion for a substantial assistance departure is made; and when the court
(whether magistrate or district judge) decides the motion. As noted above,
when the proffer occurs will typically be dictated by events out of defen-
dant's control-and more likely in the prosecution's control. When the prof-
fer occurs will in turn control when the remaining two events occur. In our
three scenarios, the prosecution discloses its decision regarding a substantial
assistance motion prior to sentencing and possibly prior to plea negotiations,
if any cooperation points are to be forthcoming at all.
Notwithstanding the necessary flexibility in timing, which is inher-
ent in gathering substantial assistance from a defendant, the goal should be
to have this process unfold to conclusion prior to the change of plea confer-
ence and ideally prior to the final negotiations of the plea agreement. In this
way, both parties enter into the plea agreement with as clear an understand-
ing of the final offense level as possible. For both parties, achievement of
this goal would minimize (though obviously not eliminate) any undue sur-
prises at sentencing.
After all, written plea agreements usually include the parties' rec-
ommendation to the court of a total adjusted offense level to be used at sen-
tencing.5' It is difficult to recommend a particular sentence or sentencing
range, as the federal rules contemplated,52 if the parties have not come to an
agreement on the anticipated total adjusted offense level. Other offense
level adjustments are usually set forth in the plea agreement. There is no
reason why the offense level adjustment a defendant may receive for sub-
stantial assistance should be treated any differently (except when the proffer
51. FED. R. CRIM. P. I1 (e)(1)(B) governs plea agreements containing sentencing recommendations that
are not binding on the court.
52. Id.
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session is delayed). Substantial assistance issues must be resolved prior to
the change of the plea conference when the written plea agreement sets forth
a specific sentence or sentencing range that is binding on the court once the
agreement is accepted.
53
The precautions embodied in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11
regarding the taking of pleas also justify adjudicating substantial assistance
motions prior to the change of the plea conference as often as possible. The
aim of the precautions and the plea colloquy between the judge and the de-
fendant at the change of plea conference is to ensure that the defendant is
entering into the plea knowingly and voluntarily.54 That goal cannot be en-
tirely achieved if the defendant admits his or her guilt before the court with-
out knowing how much the proffered assistance is worth or what the ad-
justed total offense level will be. It is also difficult to accept that a defen-
dant's plea is truly voluntary and knowing when the key factor that prompted
the defendant to resolve his or her case through a plea agreement-the sen-
tencing benefit to be received in exchange for cooperation-is still undeter-
mined at the time the defendant pleads guilty.
VI. CONCLUSION
No one disputes that sentencing lies at the heart of judicial authority.
By allowing only the government to file substantial assistance motions, judi-
cial authority has been eroded. Reform is sorely needed in this area. Re-
gardless of the specific approach we may choose, the aim should be to pre-
serve judicial sentencing authority. By allowing defendants and the gov-
ernment to file substantial assistance motions, we move in that direction.
And by so moving, we enhance fairness in sentencing by returning to judges
sentencing discretion that is now unjustifiably in the hands of the prosecu-
tion. If this proposal is adopted, more equitable sentences and fewer sen-
tencing disparities will result, and progress will be made in achieving desir-
able goals of the Sentencing Guidelines.
53. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 l(e)(i)(C).
54. "In federal courts ... Rule 11 prescribes a procedure 'designed to assist the district judge in making
the constitutionally required determination that a defendant's guilty plea is truly voluntary.. . [and] to produce
a complete record at the time the plea is entered of the factors relevant to this voluntariness determination.' "
United States v. Dewalt, 92 F.3d 1209, 1211-12 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394
U.S. 459,465 (1969)).
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